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Artificial intelligence (AI) is highly visible in today’s public media. With potential uses across 
domains such as healthcare, labour and transportation, its capacity to impact human lives is 
widely apparent. As it continues to enter into public view, concerns surrounding its research and 
application also arise. Here, narratives of techno-optimism, technological determinism, and 
dystopia often shape the AI imaginary with sensationalist displays of super-intelligence and 
existential concern. Counterpoised to these representations, this thesis investigates the sociality 
that inheres in everyday practices within artificial intelligence as emerging technology and as a 
field of study. Drawing on methods and scholarship from STS and socio-cultural anthropology, I 
explore the attitudes and experiences of specialists to analyze how entanglements of the socio-
cultural, ethical and technical appear within more mundane, everyday practices of AI. Often 
overshadowed by popular, sensationalized understandings of technology, the focus on such 
experiences and practices allows for an initial view into a situated understanding of AI beneath 
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Artificial Intelligence in the Realm of Public Issues Anthropology 
 
Towards the end of 2016, six North American tech industry giants — Amazon, Apple, 
Google, Facebook, IBM and Microsoft — announced a collaboration to study the impacts of 
artificial intelligence and create best practices for its management. Now established as the 
Partnership on AI1, this consortium is only one influential example of the increased attention 
brought to emerging technologies within the last five years. Artificial intelligence (AI) in 
particular has been given more vigorous focus due to its pronounced presence as a topic of public 
concern. Despite its often sensationalized media portrayal, as both a field of study and emerging 
technology, artificial intelligence has had a historicized presence in the public. In the North 
American setting, it falls within a rich history of science fiction in literature, but also in movies, 
video games and other popular media. From classics such as Asimov’s (1950) I, Robot to 
blockbusters such as the Terminator series, AI has engendered a view that balances fantasy and 
anxiety in the public.  
Understanding of the public’s perception of AI — that which is often inspired by the 
storied mediums previously mentioned — is complicated with the realities of the technology’s 
capabilities. In the case of AI, it appears that some of the worries imagined through the fictional 
setting have begun to bleed into reality. Multiple leading experts in AI-related industries and 
disciplines have provided public statements detailing how AI will become a cause for concern in 
many domains of our societies. While still often limited to specific tasks, technological systems 
have generally surpassed the capabilities of human action, and now more apparently surpass that 
of human thought (Cellan-Jones 2014). As the systems are applied to infrastructural aspects of 
                                                
1	Partnership on AI	https://www.partnershiponai.org/	
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society — transportation, healthcare, security, labour, welfare — AI will become more 
embedded in the everyday, ordinary experiences with noticeable public interaction. How the 
public perceives these developments will depend on many factors, but one most central is trust. It 
is unsurprising, then, that as these technologies continue to emerge and are publicized, questions 
surrounding their design, application and impact bring AI’s social and ethical implications to the 
forefront as a public issue.  
 In detailing the significance of artificial intelligence and its potential impacts on the 
public, sociality and ethics becomes a central point of discussion. As this thesis investigates the 
sociality of artificial intelligence, it considers how the socio-cultural, ethical and technical 
entangle in its practice. Through the attitudes and experiences of AI specialists, it focuses on 
articulations in more, mundane, everyday contexts beneath many of the popular views of AI. 
From here, it steps into a more situated understanding of AI and encourages work that closes the 
gap in engagement between multiple stakeholders — including the public — that are impacted 
by its research and technologies.  
For artificial intelligence to be truly trustworthy, its technologies must be constructed and 
applied in ways that are suitable for a range of experiences and contexts, not only in those that 
reproduce hegemonic, normative subscriptions of being. By acknowledging the need for 
negotiability at each stage of research, development and application, it may become easier to 
account for the potential outcomes of the socio-technological existence that is artificial 
intelligence (Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz 2013). Again, as artificial intelligence is increasingly 
brought into public view, questions about its various designs, applications and impacts are also 
publicized. While we may not be able to predict how intelligent technologies will act — even if 
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they are modelled on human behavior and researcher values — it is important to guarantee that 
they act in a non-harmful way given that they must interact with the public. 
Finally, the intended publication venue for this research is the peer-reviewed journal AI & 
Society: Knowledge, Culture and Communication. This multidisciplinary journal appeals to 
discussion on “societal issues” surrounding the design, development, application, and regulation 
of emerging technologies. In addition, it brings attention to features such as the socio-cultural 
and ethical implications of emerging technologies while promoting the diverse voices who 
engage with their outcomes. Previous topics explored in the journal include AI and governance, 


























“In my opinion, AI is going to kill people. Not in the way that everyone thinks it’s 
going to kill people, but people are going to die because of artificial intelligence” 
 
While such a prediction from an industry CEO represents just one of many possibilities, it is 
difficult to deny the potential this emerging technology has to impact humanity in ways that will 
eventuate within our lifetimes.  In current discussions on technology, artificial intelligence (AI) 
has become a media buzzword generating both hope and fear. Underlain by a long history within 
science fiction, it has garnered the interest of both techno-optimists and dystopic alarmists. 
Discourses of the technological shared and reproduced in these ways — including contemporary 
speculations by prominent figures Elon Musk and the late Stephen Hawking — have helped to 
shape public imaginations of artificial intelligence. As a counterbalance to sensationalist 
representations of AI, and also opposed to the technological determinism that such views often 
assume, this thesis investigates the sociality that inheres in everyday practices within artificial 
intelligence. More specifically, drawing on scholarship from STS and socio-cultural 
anthropology, I explore the attitudes and experiences of specialists in order to analyze how 
entanglements of the sociocultural, ethical and technical emerge within more mundane practices 
of AI research and technology. A focus on everyday practices allows for an initial view into a 




AI in the Literature  
 
As a field of study, AI may be described as the research of technological agents that 
operate with intelligence. While not entirely agreed upon, in the field intelligence has been 
generally defined as an agent’s “ability to [efficiently] optimize the world according to their 
preferences” (Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012, 2). In other words, it is an agent’s — human or 
not — ability to achieve goals based on the resources available to them across multiple domains. 
As emerging technology, these AI agents typically operate with problem-solving formulas 
known as algorithms, which interpret large quantities of information or data to reach the 
preferred outcome set by a programmer (Warwick 2012). Intelligent agents and systems have 
been categorized in different ways to distinguish how capable they are, with terms such as weak 
and strong AI being used, although these categories overlap and are not consistently taken up by 
technologists (Warwick 2012). This thesis features more of the former, also known as narrow AI. 
Technologies in this category are described as task-specific and “goal-directed” as they typically 
have “competence…in a single, restricted domain” and are “deliberately-programmed” this way 
(Bostrom 2014). Popular examples of narrow AI include virtual assistants such as Apple’s Siri 
and autopilot systems found in transportation such as planes (Markoff 2015; Shankland 2017).   
The literature on artificial intelligence within anthropology is still developing and less 
established than in other fields of STS, but topics including post-humanism, virtual worlds, and 
human-machine interaction offer related insights (Born 1997; Robertson 2007; 2010; Nardi 2010; 
Boellstorff 2012; Richardson 2015). In an earlier inquiry, Mariella Combi (1992) focuses on the 
AI imaginary in relation to how problems and solutions — both technical and social — are 
constructed through human-computer relations. This contributes to ideas on socio-technological 
co-production through the AI lens. Similarly, Diana Forsythe’s work in the early 1990’s involved 
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an ethnographic account of knowledge-making in an AI scientific community. In this, she 
investigates shared practices and meanings, accompanied by an anthropological intervention that 
highlights how knowledge is localized rather than representative of a universal commonsense 
(Forsythe 1993ab). By examining knowledge-making amongst AI experts in their practices at 
work — for example, where certain industry traditions influence technical decisions — 
Forsythe’s work interacts with the STS approach at focus in this thesis and evidences how the 
social inheres in the technological, and vice versa.  
Consideration of how socio-cultural, ethical and technical elements entangle within 
artificial intelligence requires some understanding of socio-technological co-production. This co-
production is already seen through endeavors in user experience design and telehealth, where 
social and technical components are made explicitly co-dependent and simultaneously occurring, 
from stages of product conceptualization to application2. But there also already exists an 
established body of literature within STS that shows how technologies and social orders co-
produce one another (Latour 1999; Solomon 2008). Foundational scholarship includes the work 
of Ian Hacking in The Social Construction of What? (1999), along with the seminal work of 
Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order (2004). 
They provide evidence for theory that explains how science and society are “underwriting the 
other’s existence” and how with such understanding, we should avoid “both social and scientific 
determinism” (Irwin 2008, 590). Expanding upon this in her recent contribution, Jasanoff’s 
analysis in The Ethics of Invention: Technology and the Human Future (2016) challenges 
dominant views of socio-technological interaction to further encourage an understanding that 
technology is not apolitical or amoral. This includes discussion on topics such as technological 
determinism, technocracy and unintended consequences that can damage people and places 
                                                
2 Telehealth and artificial intelligence https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/19/ada-health/ 
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interacting with technology. Again, these works explain that technology is co-productive with 
the social and their intersection should be considered when discussing, developing and applying 
the ‘products’ of science and technology.   
Accompanying co-production is scholarship on the agency of ‘things’ that would position 
emerging technologies like AI as social agents (Latour 2000; Bille and Sorensen 2007; Ingold 
2009; Edensor 2011; Olsen 2012). This means that ‘things’ also act in ways typically associated 
with human and non-human animals, being capable of relational, autonomous action within an 
environment. Thus, based on the literature it can be said that artificial intelligence manifests both 
direct physical and symbolic material agency. As technology and as a field of thought or practice, 
it has the ability to transform spaces, facilitate experience with various agential actors, and can 
create different kinds of relations — be they social, cultural, ethical, or technical (Bille and 
Sorensen 2007; Ingold 2009). AI can re-frame what it means to be human, brings people into the 
realm of human-machine interaction and produces new social orders as a point of contact for 
entanglement (Latour 1991). In these ways agency becomes another indicator of co-production 












2.2 Methodology  
 
This thesis utilizes anthropological methods, including unobtrusive observation, semi-
structured interviews, archival research, and media analysis to investigate entanglements of the 
socio-cultural, ethical and technical in artificial intelligence. What are some of the ways that 
technologists discuss the social and technological in AI? What is their making of the cultural? 
How do they engage with concepts of the ethical? Such questions guide my analysis of 
experiences shared by individuals working with narrow AI. In this context, AI specialists are 
defined as individuals from both industry and academic domains whose work or research has a 
concentrated focus on artificial intelligence. This includes a range of individuals and examples 
such as tech industry professionals applying AI techniques to business strategies, university 
professors researching machine learning, and graduate students who specialize in AI-related 
research.  
Observation occurred over three days at The Fifth Annual Conference on Governance of 
Emerging Technologies: Law, Policy and Ethics at Arizona State University. This event was 
attended by a multi-disciplinary group whose work focuses on emerging technologies including 
AI. In this research, such observation allows a “means of doing so”; the reflexive-consciousness 
of being in the field and both learning and observing enables analysis that is adaptive to 
emergence and process (Franklin and Roberts 2006). This makes it particularly suitable in an AI 
context. By “becoming the phenomenon” and attending the conference, or simulating the 
position of the specialists attending, it is possible to access the epistemological processes 
involved in the experience of being a member in an AI-related community (Franklin and Roberts 
2006). This interpretive process is informed by the notion of ethnography as embodied practice 
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and highlights the dynamic activity of the field (Cerwonka and Malkki 2008; Bernard 2011; 
Boellstorff 2012).  
Along with unobtrusive observation, semi-structured interviews were a focal 
methodological component. Seven participants were interviewed in this study — two university 
professors, two PhD students, one MSc student, one post-doctoral researcher, and one industry 
professional. Each of these individuals work within AI communities or related spaces, but with 
particular emphasis on those situated at the University of Waterloo, Canada. The faculty of 
computer science at this institution is renowned for its connections to the tech industry, with 
graduates often finding placement in positions at companies such as Google, Facebook, and 
Apple. Existence of the Artificial Intelligence Group further evidences a concentration of AI 
research at the university, adding to its appeal as a source of data.  
Semi-structured interviews allow for discussion beyond a strict discursive procedure and 
accommodates the interactive choices of participants (Briggs 1986). It is through discussion with 
the specialists — for example, in the thoughts and predictions for AI that they voice — that 
information on what constitutes the socio-cultural, ethical and technical appears. Finally, the 
interviews were approached with the concept of ‘engaged listening’ and an ethnographic 
imaginary that allows the researcher to gain ethnographic insight similar to that of participant 
observation (Forsey 2010). This is evidenced by interview questions focused on the biographies 
of participants and unanticipated changes in questions throughout each interview, according to 






2.3 Engaging AI’s sociality  
 
Studies of the sociality of science and technology have long been explored in the social 
sciences and humanities, yet studies focusing on the sociality of AI remain underdeveloped 
within anthropology. Here, I draw upon the suggestion that distinctions between the social and 
technical are often fabricated rather than actual (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Further, Johnson 
and Wetmore assert that technology is not constructed in isolation, but is co-produced with 
society. Here, it “both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, 
discourses, instruments and institutions—in short, in all the building blocks of what we term the 
social” (Jasanoff, 2004, 3; Johnson and Wetmore 2008). Addressing such a socio-technological 
co-production of artificial intelligence exposes how its features are in constant entanglement 
while simultaneously emphasizing the features and how they hold potential, contingent 
configurations specific to the AI context, still removed from a narrative of technological 
determinism.  
 How does artificial intelligence illustrate socio-technological co-production? Popular 
media examples consist of goals interacting directly with society, such as building machines with 
human-like minds or creating androids; but these are only one popularized subset of the socio-
technical relationship AI contains. Much of the ordinary, technical decisions within the everyday 
practices of AI work also articulate with factors categorized as ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ and the 
relation to being human. But in talking with one professor of computer science at the University 
of Waterloo, such articulation is not always realized:   
“Artificial intelligence has always been concerned primarily with building 
machines that are operating independently from humans. Most of AI is building 
machines that have nothing to do with human beings, they’re just completely 
separate. Even a machine that plays chess, it doesn’t care that it’s playing against 
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a human. It could be playing against another machine; it’s got no model of the 
human. Same thing for these poker-playing robots. They’re not modelling human 
feeling they’re not modelling human anything, they’re just modelling the game. 
They’re just modelling inanimate objects and that’s all…that’s really weird when 
you think about it. There’s no doubt that everybody must know that intelligence 
has a lot to do with other people. You spend a lot of your time thinking about 
other human beings” 
 
This quote reflects on how AI systems are sometimes framed simply as “technical objects”, 
where humans may be excluded from the programming despite potential human-system 
interactions in application. This is especially noticeable in news of driverless cars and a focus on 
their efficiency through the reduction of human mistakes with the removal of physical, human 
direction of the machines. In removing the human variable, it may also act as a separation of 
social and technical to “establish the universality and effectivity” of the technology (Born 1997, 
142). This then aligns with larger, structural and institutional goals in industry and public 
domains where AI technologies are increasingly implemented for social and economic solutions. 
Here it is also possible that a notion of technology in isolation partially explains a perceived 
distance of AI systems from the social. This view is not uncommon and follows the positioning 
of science external to the social to “protect the ‘value neutrality’ of the scientific process” 
(Douglas 2007, 127; Thorpe 2008; Liu 2017). It is a view that has been analyzed in more 
historical contexts, such as in Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1991). For example, in one 
chapter he discusses Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) with a discussion 
of topics including political and scientific representations, fact-making and the boundaries of 
science. And while many of the operational aspects of intelligent machines can be separated 
from humans in practice when given emphasis on automation, the development or “building” of 
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these machines is fundamentally entangled in and co-productive with human-machine interaction 
(Robertson 2010; Richardson 2015). Even in technical categorizations of autonomy —
independent agential action separated from the programmer’s original input —  there are 
instances in which developers must evaluate and re-adjust the machine’s operational capacities 
(Warwick 2012). This follows assertions that technology is “patterned by the conditions of its 
creation and use” and technical decisions made at one point in time can impact development 
made at another and vice versa (Mosemghvdlishvili and Jeroen 2013). Thus, from acquiring 
datasets to programming algorithms and designing user interfaces, AI produces and is produced 
by entanglements of the socio-cultural and technical, amongst the many other factors commonly 
attributed to human sociality.  
 At the conference on Governance of Emerging Technologies where my observation took 
place, in a keynote speech on the responsible development of AI, a well-known figure in the field 
called to both ‘maximize human values’ and manage risk in AI by accounting for the “biggest 
deviation of rationality” — our wants. They expressed that by “learning to predict what people 
want”, it will become easier to develop systems that are beneficial. To reach prediction they 
explained that it would require “cultural work”, although the details of this were not specified. It 
was not made clear who the ‘people’ referenced would be, although the call for ‘cultural work’ 
seemed to suggest a holistic survey of societies globally. Despite this, it was not discussed how 
people’s ‘wants’ could come into conflict, which instead assumes a shared set of ‘wants’ across 
the referenced ‘people’. This omits a common reality where wants are often negotiated and in 
tension between multiple stakeholders, across and within societies, communities, groups and 
individuals. Similarly, research on the usefulness of psychological and sociological models 
underpins some approaches in in artificial intelligence. For example, in a subfield of computer 
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science, Affective Computing, a major theoretical influence comes from Affect Control Theory 
(ACT). This sociological theory considers the relationship between emotion and ‘culture’ 
through the categorization of “socially shared patterns of affective meaning” (Rogers et. al 2014). 
One of the interviewed professors works with building sociological models into AI solutions 
through this field of research. They explain that the models rely on “the sort of collective 
consciousness or collective nature of human intelligence” which in this case, becomes associated 
with affect and emotion. How this is mapped to culture through AI techniques is exemplified in a 
program mentioned by the professor known as Interact. Available for download through Indiana 
University (2016): 
“Interact is a computer program that describes what people might do in a given 
situation, how they might respond emotionally to events, and how they might 
attribute qualities or new identities to themselves and other interactants in order to 
account for unexpected happenings. Interact achieves its results by employing 
multivariate non-linear equations that describe how events create impressions, by 
implementing a cybernetic model that represents people as maintaining cultural 
meanings through their actions and interpretations, and by incorporating 
repositories of cultural meanings” 
 
The repositories of cultural meanings are formatted as dictionaries of affective meaning. These 
contain set identities, behaviours, and settings. Categorized by place and date, some of the listed 
dictionaries include U.S.A.: Indiana 2003, Japan 1989-2002, Germany 2007, and Northern 
Ireland 1977. Data from these dictionaries then help to model interactions between actors and 





Figure 1 Interact model of interactions3 
 
In Interact, cultures are depicted as totalities that fall within a normative process of 
STEM-related description. Philosophies of science often support this positioning that, rather than 
privileging individualism, emphasizes naturally embodied dispositions substantiated by a group, 
corroborated as “culture” (Solomon 2008). Anthropologists, however, have problematized the 
definition of culture as a bounded concept4. Emphasizing intragroup variations and movements 
(e.g. migrations), they argue that cultures are not homogenous entities (Clifford and Marcus 1986; 
Helmreich 2001). The categorization in Interact of place-based identity, behavior and setting 
meant to determine affect and impression reproduces the definition of culture as bounded and 
                                                
3 Interact	http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact.htm	
4 Definitions of culture have been problematized for many years (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Hobart 2000) 
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assumes a universality of emotions. It also places social experience as something that is rigidly 
patterned, based on its representation as static and deterministic.  
For one, the codifying of emotions is already bound by cultural interpretations of emotion 
in the Interact program because it is influenced by the epistemological stance of ACT. In the 
representations of consistent “cultures”, it also simultaneously erases and reifies various social 
and cultural elements due its reliance on universality. Again, anthropologists have problematized 
universality and homogeneity both theoretically and methodologically. In more recent trends, an 
ontological approach would question the universality applied to social and cultural phenomena 
through a program like Interact. This would suggest that the phenomena are brought into 
existence through their delineation in the first place, rather than being universally attributed and 
pre-existing conditions (Coopmans et al. 2014; Hoeppe 2015). In other words, the codifying of 
‘culture’ and emotions in this way is itself an embodied ‘cultural’ interpretation — a 
phenomenon brought into the world through the activity of codifying itself.  
 Along this view, the reifying of culture as a set of specific variables also frames social 
and cultural elements as technical. As previously discussed, AI is sometimes framed as a set of 
technical objects, separating the social and technical to consolidate the universality of its systems 
and technologies. Those transforming intangible, non-technical socio-cultural factors into 
representations of data produce inscriptions — that is, “visual/textual translations and extensions 
of scientific practice” (Latour and Woolgar 1986, 142). These inscriptions frame such factors as 
technical objects and aim to legitimize their representation as ‘technical’ (Latour and Woolgar 
1986). This then has the effect of reifying a universality in these social and technical elements. 
But as this analysis has shown, instead it results in an essentialist and reductionist approach to 
the socio-cultural elements and emotions highlighted in the computer simulations of Interact. 
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Again, this is antithetical to current anthropological approaches to “cultural” analysis, but 
nonetheless, is also extended to other contexts of AI application as explored below.  
 
Managing co-production   
Noted above, through programs and development using notions of culture and identity in 
certain ways, the technologies too, become entangled with certain makings of the socio-cultural. 
How this co-production affects users has already been framed as yielding both positive and 
negative results for public contexts. This is related to ways that power and governance emerge 
through AI’s socio-technological framework. Venn (2007) suggests that current Western 
governmentality is increasingly defined by bio-political modes of governance that are 
"mediatized and informationalized" in the attempts to 'improve our lives' through additional 
surveillance. Here, technologies are viewed as tools to be employed for enhanced efficiency and 
accuracy in domains such as healthcare, labour and security. A professor of computer science at 
the University of Waterloo presents an example that shows how this might work in practice. 
They explain that application of AI techniques for "risk assessment in the justice system" is an 
"obvious ethical concern" and "when it involves human rights there needs to be oversight". At 
this point, the ethical becomes apparent for the professor in the context of human rights discourse. 
They then further explained: 
“Judges are deciding how long to sentence somebody based on their risk, a risk of 
re-offending. And if this is being done by black box machine learning techniques, 
where there’s no human in the loop that is held accountable for the 
recommendation, clearly that’s not right...” 
 
With the increasing emphasis on information and data in the Information Age, artificial 
intelligence has shifted into a position of increased authority. Here, some scholars note that 
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technologies hold an authoritative position because they allow for a transcendence of humanity 
and nature (Turner 2007; Yampolskiy and Fox 2013; Muller 2014). As mentioned above, certain 
AI-related technologies have proven enhanced surveillance capabilities which have been 
employed within policing. Through systems using machine learning techniques, the New York 
Police Department has attempted "predictive policing" which tries to identify "where and when 
crimes are more likely to happen and who may commit them" (Stanford University 2016; 
Newcombe 2016). This can be problematized for issues with bias and a concern that when 
obtaining predictions from policing machines, the socio-economic factors that contribute to 
perceived crime ‘hot-spots’ are not taken into consideration, although they could potentially be 
considered in the system design process by developers. It is an example of how AI systems can 
reproduce bias despite their representation as ‘neutral’ and unbiased. This is accompanied by 
research explaining how incarceration rates for certain minority groups are already statistically 
higher due to racial profiling and other forms of systemic inequality resulting from residual 
imperialist thought that places certain bodies under directed surveillance by the state (Miller 
2014). These narrow AI techniques begin to "define how we are seen, by providing a digital lens, 
tailored by statistics and other biases” and populations are represented as data (van Otterlo 2014, 
258).  
 An example of how populations are represented as data comes from an industry context 
where AI is used to account for forms of bias. One participant, co-founder and CEO of a 
company in the talent acquisition industry discussed how AI works against unconscious human 
bias in their services:   
“One of the things that [cognitive recruiting assistant AI] doesn’t do is review 
resumes based on name. Name is one of the first lines of defence that we use 
against that type of bias. Names can be racially imbued, they can be engendered, 
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so forth and so forth. Within our system the actual matching algorithms that occur, 
from personality fit to concept analysis, do not involve name whereas the human 
recruiter always involves name” 
 
Here, the major focus is the reduction of gendered and racialized bias in human decision-making 
processes. They further explained the unbiased status of the underlying programming of AI 
techniques employed in this: 
“A machine learning algorithm in and of itself is not biased. It doesn’t have an 
ethical disposition one way or another. As the algorithm learns from either the 
human-trained input or the self-learned input, we have to identify what those 
outcomes are of the algorithm. We have to be able to identify whether or not it is 
actually causing the ideal resultant, otherwise it becomes a useless piece of 
software. What we want within our datasets— that’s the piece that can start to 
cause particular types of bias, potentially in the future. That’s where audits are 
required, internal audits: ‘are we representing a broad enough dataset or broad 
enough database for x type of job position, x sector of job etcetera, etcetera?’ So 
we do take it on ourselves to see, are we getting a good cross-section or 
representation of those that are applying to jobs?” 
 
Data is highlighted as the likely vessel for bias given its more direct connection to human input 
and decisions. What data is used, how diverse it is, where it was acquired — these sorts of 
questions were also mentioned in discussion with the CEO as they apply to algorithmic data bias. 
In application, the AI is meant to correct for human bias by editing out certain social factors. 
Working with representations of identity as data, there is a return to the social becoming an 
object. And while the AI specialist addresses matters of representation and systemic bias 
critically, they also seem to position bias as a technical problem to be dealt with through a wide 
held understanding that algorithms are inherently asocial.  
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Those developing algorithms are influenced by multiple factors that are social — the 
algorithms too, are already social, as the decisions of human developers. And within their work 
these specialists craft an understanding of how the technical components articulate with other 
expertise and forms of knowledge, all of which are value-laden. They must balance factors 
ranging from technical operations, funding influences, compatibility with user design while 
ensuring that the algorithms are adapted for other, already existing and emerging technologies 
and so on (Johnson and Wetmore 2008; Ekbia 2008; Warwick 2012). In other words, when an AI 
researcher or developer makes a decision it is “not simply a detached technical decision but has 
ethical and value content and implications” (Johnson and Wetmore 2008, 572). Added to this,  
recent work suggests that humans prefer to anthropomorphize objects in order to establish their 
relation to non-human objects. Thus, what we represent as identity and personality is projected 
onto objects and is more heightened when they "evoke a sense of agency", such as in AI 
technologies. In other words, the designer or developer may consciously or unconsciously aim to 
maintain their “social world” in the design of expert systems (Sherr 1995; Eyssel et al. 2012; 
Picarra et al. 2016). 
Finally, extended to the discussion on governance, the concept of negotiability in 
technology “points to the existence of a surplus of workable solutions or choices for any given 
technology, both in the process of design and in its utilization”, negotiated by different groups 
with varying levels of social, political and economic power or authority. In AI, this multitude of 
actors and their decisions also impacts the range of choices that affect development, meaning 
that “certain solutions may become entrenched in the technical or social infrastructure of existing 
technologies” (Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz 2013, 1599). Thus, with the above considered — of 
co-production, an ontological approach, and the negotiability of choices and action — I suggest 
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that the social already inheres in practices of AI. In other words, and while it may not be 
acknowledged, there is no designing “out” the social from algorithms because technical practices 






















2.4 Beneath the Hype 
 
Emerging technologies often evoke a narrative that frames innovation and development 
as inherently beneficial for humanity (Ekbia 2008; Stanford University 2016). A computer 
science professor specializing in optimization specifically noted this innovation discourse and 
referred to it as ‘techno-optimism’ — a notion that technology “will solve all the problems and 
it’s only a good thing”. They described an ethos of techno-optimism at their campus amongst 
students and colleagues. This was also positioned alongside current sensationalized research and 
popular narratives. Both of the professors interviewed mentioned that there is a pattern in AI, 
like other STEM-related disciplines, wherein certain breakthroughs reach a level of visibility that 
even sparks interest in the general public. The current interest surrounds work on machine 
learning and deep neural networks, but they explained that this happens “once every 10 years” 
and that there have been at least “two of these hypes in the past” for AI. Such ‘hypes’ are not 
uncommon for academia regardless of discipline, but with technological development there is 
also emphasis on how it is an indicator of intellectual and societal ‘progress’ (Genus 2006).  
On the discourse surrounding autonomous driving, one professor referred to the director 
of Microsoft Research who argues that autonomous driving prevents deaths from drunk driving. 
This professor provided a counter-argument: 
“There’s easy technological fixes that prevent people from driving their cars 
when they’re drunk…You don’t have to go to autonomous driving to save 40,000 
people, you can do it for a few hundred dollars. Autonomous driving will add 
thousands and thousands to the price of a car, so it’s more of a ‘I love technology’ 




In this statement, the professor suggests that there are already existing, commonplace fixes for 
current problems, but they are overshadowed by techno-optimism and to some extent, a 
fetishization of innovation. As well, those working in AI recognize that public perceptions of AI 
hype do not necessarily reflect actual spaces and practices of ordinary, everyday work in AI. In 
many instances, beneath the hype, the reality of the expected capabilities of AI are much more 
ordinary. For example, one PhD student explained that the “development as of two years ago” 
was “the robot can figure out when a chair is in its way and move the chair out of its way so it 
can continue rolling down the hallway”. They also suggested that in many of the industry jobs 
that University of Waterloo computer science graduates pursue, work is configured as technical 
tasks instead of societally transformative undertakings:  
“Their jobs are not going to be 'how to design a comprehensive framework for 
running autonomous cars as a company, as a societal thing'; it's going to be 'can 
we solve this route planning problem for autonomous cars? Can we do image 
recognition accurately?'" 
 
This suggests that for those working in AI the focus is not always aimed directly at the 
sensational aspect of what the work entails. Instead, it is the technical frameworks and solutions 
to specific problems that are of most interest. For some it is in the specialized forms of AI — 
formed from these more basic, everyday practices often based on “statistics and reasoning”, as 
one PhD student states — that create the most concern in practice.  
A PhD student specializing in computer vision indicated that the repercussions of narrow 
AI seen with special purpose algorithms have an immediacy that is more worrying than the 
popular displays of general-purpose systems: “what people will do with the special-purpose 
algorithms, that’s more of a concern from my perspective because it’s more immediate and even 
in some cases already occurring”. Here, AI is positioned as a neutral tool that, in its use, becomes 
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embedded with moral value. Emergent technologies are neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, but 
neither are they neutral or value-free. Special-purpose algorithms have already been noted with 
machine learning and deep learning application, like that of the talent acquisition industry and 
predictive policing examples earlier discussed. They are also prevalent in commonly used, online 
search engines and social media applications that have become part of the everyday for many5. 
Thus, rather than the concern being what people will do with these algorithms, it is how these 
algorithms already impact developers, users and environments and “changes the way people 
interact with the world”, as a professor of computer science explained.   
These concerns are additionally compacted with the black box problem in artificial 
intelligence. This has been framed in the technical sense, as systems with mysterious or unknown 
internal operations (Hackett et al. 2008). But in science studies, the black box problem can refer 
to “the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a machine 
runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs 
and not on its internal complexity” (Latour 1999, 304). For AI, the black box problem has been 
exacerbated by advancements in those special-purpose systems with machine learning and deep 
neural networks that involve an amount of data and processing too complex for human 
capabilities (Ekbia 2008). In other words, researchers and developers aren’t always sure what 
computations occur when a system is operating because it works beyond the understandings and 
predictions of the programmers themselves. But besides an issue with understanding it also 
reinforces notions of technology in isolation and perhaps guides researchers into focusing on 
those technical tasks that created concern in the first place. The black box problem with narrow 
                                                
5 Google’s use of deep learning https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/08/08/the-amazing-ways-how-
google-uses-deep-learning-ai/#3346dd023204 
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AI further leads to questions of ethical and social implications under a frame of uncertainty, 
explored in the next section. 
 
AI and the ethical 
Examining some of the ways that specialists configure the ethical in everyday practices 
of AI fits alongside insights on the ways that sociality entangles with artificial intelligence. 
Ethics has been a topic of inquiry in STS with extensive work on bioethics and technoethics in 
particular. In anthropology, it has been approached through two major tracks — as value models 
guiding research and as a topic of study exploring the ways that morality is manifested and 
maintained in the range of everyday experiences, contexts and interactions of individuals and 
communities (Scheper-Hughes 1995; D’Andrade 1995; Nader 2002; Laidlaw 2002; Lambek 
2010; Robbins 2016). This thesis follows the latter. There are various means to consider how 
ethics enters the everyday. For example, Zigon (2010) uses a phenomenological approach that 
considers assemblage — articulations of components, be they institutional or public discourses 
and embodied dispositions — and highlights practice across multiple agential capacities. He 
emphasizes that morality is not a closed system, but radically context-dependent. Other more 
critical approaches require both empirical and theoretical investigation that accounts for 
epistemological processes (Fassin 2008). In any such approach, the emphasis on ordinary 
activities and decisions in daily experiences remains the central sites for analysis in this thesis 
(Lambek 2010).  
Questions on ethics in relation to artificial intelligence have received increased public 
attention during the last few years. It has also been an established feature in academic spaces 
through literature on roboethics and machine ethics (Allen et al. 2006; Moor 2006; Anderson and 
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Anderson 2007; Anderson 2008; Dougherty et al. 2013; Brundage et al. 2014; Vanderelst and 
Winfield 2016). In AI scholarly contexts, discussions have tended to privilege certain 
configurations or models of ethics, mainly those influenced by Western moral philosophy that 
frame ethics as a “complex form of decision-making” (Wallach et al. 2008; Torrance 2013; 
Englert et al. 2014; Cervantes et al. 2016). 
Studies in educational settings show that AI is a subfield of computers science and that it 
is a considerably practice-oriented discipline. For example, students learn various coding 
languages, typically accessed through computer interaction. Thus, students must physically code 
using a machine in order to understand how the user’s input influences the functions of the 
system (Kay et al. 2000; Helmreich 2001). With primary actions typically facilitated by a 
computer then, to “AI specialists the central meaning of work may be writing code and building 
systems” (Forsythe 1993a, 470; Kay et al. 2000; Helmreich 2001). This was similarly noted by a 
professor of computer science who explained that “at the research level it’s just studying 
algorithms”, giving the example where “you create some image database and then you write 
some algorithms to classify images or something like that, but you can do all that without asking 
a human being to do anything”.  
Thus, even as AI entangles social and technical elements, there are moments in its 
everyday practice that distance specialists from the social elements, including those related to 
ethical features. With the characterization of work in AI assigned to certain structures of 
discourse, other topics can be sidelined and positioned as play or as a “waste of time” while the 
technical, algorithmic aspects of AI become the focus (Forsythe 1993ab). This came into 
discussion with a graduate student specializing in multi-agent systems when talking about AI 
ethics: 
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“I think ethical discussion is good, I mean that's definitely my background. I'm 
more interested in arts and social sciences and junk like that than most people in 
computer science” 
 
The association of ethical discussion with humanistic disciplines — in this example somewhat 
stigmatized as “junk like that” — distances ethics from AI as something that may be external to 
it. Placing ethics in a position alongside technical tasks may also mask other considerations and 
consequences of the technologies at work. When asked about discussion of ethics in their 
education, the graduate student explained that if ethics was spoken about it was done in an 
“intentional way” such as in special classes and application examples. This was further 
confirmed by one of the PhD students who was familiar with the more administrative side of the 
program which the Master’s student is enrolled in. To another PhD student working in machine 
learning and computer vision, the ethical was discussed through direct reference to Western 
philosophical theories of ethics important to AI and computer science. They described the 
relation ethics has to theoretical computer science and problem-solving methods used for 
algorithms depending on the class of complexity of a problem.  
For some it is a question of understanding. The university professor working with 
sociological models explained:  
“It’s hard for me to talk about ethics because I don’t really understand it that well 
to be quite honest with you; and that’s probably the same for a lot of computer 
scientists, artificial intelligence researchers — that we’re not too clear on what 
ethics is. I’m trying to learn, understanding it now at this kind of cultural 
consensus about things that we label as good vs bad essentially, but I know that 
there’s other aspects to it. There’s these ‘whether you believe that all that matters 




For others, like a PhD student studying multi-agent systems, there was more concern about their 
competency in discussing the ethical: 
“I don't know if I am qualified yet to really make professional thoughts about it. I 
don't have an ethics background. I have a computer science background which 
maybe gives me insight into some areas of it, but certainly does not give me the 
full picture” 
 
In the above examples from AI specialists, ethics is discussed according to some form of 
formalized model of thought — either as philosophical theories and problem-solving methods, or 
as a qualified background in ethics. There appears to be a designation of authority on who may 
discuss ethics and how it should be done. In this way ethics may be framed as a technical 
problem that unintentionally positions it as separate from the scientific practice. While this 
returns to the idea of technology in isolation, it is only one making of ethics for some AI 
specialists. In another context beyond the defined, categorized ‘ethics’, engagement with the 
ethical as a broader condition was an apparent point of analysis. The professor of computer 
science specializing in constraint programming explained that ethical discussion is considered 
more of a “challenge outside of the curriculum” as “people don’t like to look too closely at what 
they’re doing I guess, ‘cause it’s troubling sometimes, the role that we play”.  
 This participant continued with their explanation, speaking about issues of economic 
inequality in North America where individuals employed through fields such as computer 
science are part of a “select group that are all the wealth”. This was reiterated in the common 
mention of technological unemployment by participants and other major issues associated with 
AI in the popular discourses, but with an underlying theme of uncertainty. For these AI 
specialists, uncertainty can be framed as both a challenge within the technical side of computer 
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science and one that is ethical. On the technical side, there is a problem of implementing ethical 
principles within systems affected by “reasoning under uncertainty” that, as one PhD student 
explained “is and has always been a key challenge in artificial intelligence”. This concern is also 
popular in the machine ethics literature and testing of ethical implementation has been discussed, 
but remains more speculative than evidential at this point in time (Anderson and Anderson 2007). 
The other challenge of uncertainty — as something accompanying the ethical dimensions of 
emerging technologies — becomes normalized through these specialists’ approaches to the 
social implications of AI, as previously explored (Akama et al. 2015). By conceptualizing ethics 
and ethical challenges as things that compose an independent field of expertise like that of 
artificial intelligence, along with the uncertainty associated with both AI’s implications and a 
defined ethics, the two become simultaneously comparable and appear to be disentangled. As a 
result, when an AI specialist explains their position working in AI and actively states their 
detachment from the knowledge that an ethicist has, despite being implicated in ethical items 














2.5 Discussion: Expanding Regulation and Expertise   
Currently there are no official standards of ethical practice that guide the development 
and application of artificial intelligence. In speaking with my interlocutors and from my 
observations at the conference on emerging technologies, there are more informal forms of best 
practice and documents employed by researchers and developers through their local affiliations, 
but anything encompassing AI in general has met resistance due to difficulties addressing its 
varied application across multiple domains. Here, themes of moderation and accountability 
emerged in the responses by interlocutors. The industry professional for example, preferred the 
term “moderation” rather than regulation and explained that it would be better not to stop the 
“trajectory of technology” this way. This followed the previously described techno-optimism and 
reinforces the idea of technology in isolation in that it suggests that technology has its own 
trajectory untouched by other factors, including human influence. In this notion of moderation, 
there was emphasis on a need for collaboration between multiple stakeholders and actionable 
insights to come from this.  
For others like the PhD student in computer vision and machine learning, there could be 
regulation, and it would imply collaboration too: 
“I think the primary groups that you would need are the politicians and legal 
scholars, application area experts, people who are experts in the problem that the 
AI system is being applied to, and experts in the development of artificial 
intelligent systems. I think good reasonable laws that allow AI systems to serve 
the public interest and move society forward, I think they could be created, but I 
think it would have to involved a group like that to design them where all of the 
parties take all of the others seriously” 
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The PhD student further explained that “one thing that people often don’t think of in the general 
public discourse is that somebody is going to have to actually write the programs that do these 
things” and at that those other parties involved will have to listen to computer scientists about 
what can occur, to make sure that it is computationally feasible in the first place. How these laws 
will balance social and ethical requirements with technical abilities suggests that there is a 
perspective of compromise and imperfection, which may also stem from conditions of 
uncertainty. While this is a concern to seriously consider in moderating AI technologies, this also 
leaves a lack of inclusion of other kinds of expertise from groups that act outside of traditional 
legal and economic backgrounds.  
The considerable underrepresentation of women and people of colour in STEM fields is 
well recognized (Morganson et al. 2010; Good et al. 2012; Fontana et al. 2013). This is also 
evident in initiatives such as the IEEE’s Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing 
Human Wellbeing with Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems, which focuses on 
“empowering technologists to prioritize ethical considerations in the creation of Artificial 
Intelligence and Autonomous Systems”. The IEEE describes the document as representing “the 
collective input of over one hundred global thought leaders in the fields of Artificial Intelligence, 
law and ethics, philosophy, and policy from the realms of academia, science, and the government 
and corporate sectors” (IEEE 2016). But in the document itself there is little reference to 
“thought leaders” in anthropology, STS, women’s studies, sociology or other areas of thought 
that have thoroughly evidenced, established, valuable input about technology and society that 
‘technologists’ can use. It is also here that the underrepresentation of women and people of 
colour re-appears. If moderation is to occur amongst an assemblage of stakeholders, it is 
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necessary to acknowledge that the stakes are high for everyone and that there are certain voices 
and areas of inquiry that are neglected by other epistemological traditions.  
Here, inclusion can also act as ethical practice, just as collaboration may be a method of 
regulation. As suggested, even in those initiatives claiming diversity, certain peoples and 
methods of inquiry are ignored. Those claiming diversity cannot distance themselves from the 
underlying structures and discourses that background not only the initiatives, but their own 
histories, identities, practices, and so on. It is these things that may allow for a lack of inclusion, 
as noted earlier.  Influencing this understanding, Jenny Reardon’s work on the Human Genome 
Diversity Project uses an analysis of coproduction to address issues of “equity, participation and 
subjects’ rights” and comments on inclusion (2001, 371). She attributes the failure of the HGDP, 
in part, to a lack of appreciation for the full scope of ethical considerations. Extended to Ethically 
Aligned Design, the expertise and backgrounds noted for collaboration become the principle 
communities and standard contexts in the document’s discussion of ethical design in AI. The 
emphasis on STEM, government and industry caters to certain questions and reinforces certain 
definitions of ethics, methods of ethical action, as well as what the major social implications of 
AI are. For example, the concern about technological unemployment mentioned in previous 
sections is mainly positioned with economic issues. This misses an abundance of other factors 
implicated in technological unemployment that are often addressed and represented by voices not 
within STEM, for instance. Including additional collaborators and perspectives is necessary to 
ask more inclusive questions that are cognizant of experiences and discourses which prove that 
social, ethical, and scientific/technical issues are “inextricably interconnected and come into 
being together” (Reardon, 2001, 381). Thus, while Ethically Aligned Design and similar 
initiatives such as the Partnership on AI aim to build an ethical element into development from 
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the beginning, to allow for more socially responsible AI, there is a need for increased 
representation and inclusion. 
Finally, briefly mentioning collaboration as regulation — considering the previously 
mentioned concept of negotiability in technology, if certain expertise is considered and others are 
not, regulation or ‘moderation’ can become black-boxed too (Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz 
2013). Other expertise should also be accompanied by another important factor — public input. 
There is a need for integrated publics in collaborative efforts of regulation as there is a gap in 
both localized and structural engagement with the public in these initiatives. This is no fault of 
computer scientists and is often due to institutional restrictions and lack of encouragement for 
knowledge dissemination accompanied by a public image of AI that is more fantastical than 
realistic. Importantly, representation and interaction in collaborative efforts such as Ethically 
Aligned Design could promote education in AI and foster public trust, but it must not act as a 
placeholder for ethical action as it has in other domains, but one of many techniques in the 
emergent environment of AI (Hayden 2007). For these reasons, collaboration beyond the norm 
and dominant epistemological practices is most beneficial. How this works in action is enough 
discussion for separate additional study, but the present suggestion of a more critical view in 











While much of the public media is concerned with the thrills of artificial intelligence, this 
work brings to light some of the more ordinary discourses and practices around artificial 
intelligence. First, I investigate how socio-cultural phenomena are entangled in AI through co-
production. This refutes notions of technology in isolation that divorces technical results from 
social influences. Exploring makings of the social-cultural in examples such as bias in AI design 
and application, I highlight how technical decisions are entangled with sociality. This further 
confirms how technology is not neutral as the personal beliefs and values of designers, 
developers and researchers quite often enter the systems they create (Sherr 1995). Next, as 
additional insight into the socio-technological co-production of artificial intelligence, I uncover 
some of the ways that popular ideologies including techno-optimism and innovation interact with 
the entanglements of social, cultural, and technical in AI. In this discussion I also note how the 
ethical is negotiated through normalized uncertainty and the ways that it is formed in special-
purpose systems, beneath the hype. Finally, I provide discussion on the regulation of AI and the 
need for increased pubic integration and inclusive expertise. This is meant to encourage a more 
critical approach to AI’s capabilities and potential implications so that it is more beneficial to the 
heterogeneity of publics that will interact with the emerging technology.  
This thesis adds some perspective to the ways that artificial intelligence entangles social, 
cultural, ethical and technical factors. Additional study is surely required to go beyond my brief 
focus on a small group of AI specialists, to the great variety of communities, discourses and 
processes involved in the various emerging contexts of artificial intelligence. Other scholarly 
endeavours could include ethnographies on applied AI and public knowledge, feminist STS 
analysis of AI systems in healthcare, or case-studies in globalizing artificial intelligence. An 
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anthropological study of machine ethics — the field focusing on ethical embodiment by 
intelligent machines — would also be of interest (Anderson and Anderson 2007). In order to 
reach the goal of technological systems that enact globalizing diversity and reduce prevalent 
ideological and social biases, understanding that technology is co-productive with society and 
how we reach this understanding is important. It is in all of our best interests to guarantee non-
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